INCIDENT REPORT - INTREPID CLASS ENGINE AND WEAPON SYSTEMS FIELD TEST

Author: Intrepid Development Test Engineer Cmdr M. Rance

Stardate 46839.2 - 23695 min readINTREPID CLASS DEVELOPMENT


INCIDENT REPORT - INTREPID CLASS ENGINE AND WEAPON SYSTEMS FIELD TEST

Incident Timeline:

Stardate 46833.5


06:00 - Prototype vessel USS Intrepid NX 74600 departs Utopia Planetia having taken on resources and armament to assess starship class readiness ahead of full production order to be approved by Starfleet R&D. Vessel crewed by minimal compliment.

06:05 - USS Intrepid successfully clears drydock without incident. Thruster systems operate within expected parameters. Ship transitions to impulse power. Warp core pressure slightly above expected levels after matter/antimatter reaction initiated.

06:07 - Engineering reports that they’re preparing to lock down the magnetic constrictors and that the engine test may need to be canceled.

06:08 - Engineering reports pressure has dropped without further intervention. Tests can proceed.

06:10 - Prototype class 9 warp drive initiated. Course set for weapons testing region outside Sol System.

06:10 - 06:30 - Ship transitions incrementally to warp factor 9 and back down to warp 2. Irregular pressure levels reported at higher velocities.

07:00 - After maintaining warp 2 for 30 Earth minutes. USS Intrepid arrives at the testing region. Sensors report presence of 10 targeting probes as well as assorted stellar debris. Radiation levels are in line with what is expected for this region of space.

07:02 - Sensor lock established on first probe. Ventral phaser arrays confirm lock and fire. Power grid handles additional load without issue. Reported .4 second efficiency increase in computer processing time with bio-neural circuitry versus most recent phaser array tests using isolinear circuitry.

07:03 - Ship thrusters are engaged to execute a 172 degree roll

07:04 - Sensor lock established lock on second probe. Dorsal phaser arrays confirm lock and fire. Phaser beam is held on target for 5.23 seconds.

07:04:05 - EPS conduit ruptures on Deck 11, Engineering section.

07:04:10 - Engineering cuts power to dorsal phaser arrays.

07:04:15 - Bridge receives communication from Engineering. Confirming no injuries. Cause of rupture to be investigated. Recommends venting 2% of warp plasma to reduce strain on EPS grid.

07:05 - Venting procedure approved. Sensors confirm vent sequence and standard dissipation pattern.

07:15 - Engineering reports pressure increase in warp core just before the rupture. Recommends running the next series of tests using fusion reactor power while fluctuation in main power delivery and warp core pressure is investigated in parallel.

07:22 - Ship Thrusters are engaged to execute a 188 degree roll.

07:22 - Ship thrusters are engaged to execute a 47 degree turn.

07:23 - Sensor lock established on third probe. Starboard phaser arrays confirm lock and fire. No further overloads or power fluctuations reported.

07:24 - Ship thrusters are engaged to execute a 42 degree turn.

07:25 - Sensor lock established on fourth probe. Port phaser arrays confirm lock and fire. No further overloads or power fluctuations reported.

07:26 - Ship thrusters are engaged to execute a 90 degree turn.

07:27 - Sensor lock established on fifth probe. Forward phaser arrays confirm lock and fire. No further overloads or power fluctuations reported.

07:28 - Ship thrusters are engaged to execute a 164 degree turn.

07:29 - Sensor lock established on sixth probe. Rear phaser arrays confirm lock and fire. Loss of output versus main power firing sequence measured at 4.7%

07:30 - Ship thrusters are engaged to execute a 190 degree turn.

07:30 - Bridge orders preparation of a prototype tricobalt device at maximum potential yield (30,000 teracochranes).

07:40 - Tactical officer reports that the device has been prepared and is ready for a test firing sequence. Torpedo control is awaiting orders to load the device into the torpedo tube.

07:41 - Drill conducted to test torpedo firing mechanism with standard class II probe. Launcher fires without incident.

07:42 - Bridge gives order to load Tricobalt device.

07:45 - Sensor lock established on seventh probe. Forward Torpedo Launcher #1 confirms lock. Launcher fires without incident.

07:45:02 - Sensors report device contact with probe.

07:45:03 - Sensors report thermokinetic output of detonation far above projections. Sensors confirm the presence of a shockwave generated by the explosion.

07:45:04 - USS Intrepid automated systems trigger red alert and begin raising shields.

07:45:06 - Shields level registers at 20%. Shield systems register insufficient power for full operation due to restrictions placed on main power allocation by engineering diagnostics. Sensors and inertial dampers confirm collision of shockwave with USS Intrepid

07:45:08 - Sensors detect abnormal levels of subspace distortion.

07:45:15 - Subspace distortions completely disable main and secondary power on USS Intrepid. Emergency power allocated to life support systems and emergency SOS communications.

07:45:17 - Automated distress call sent by USS Intrepid

07:52 - Distress call acknowledged by USS Rubidoux.

09:10 - USS Rubidoux arrives at the test site.

12:31 - USS Rubidoux engages tractor beam. USS Intrepid towed back to Earth Station McKinley.


Engineers Summary and Conclusion


As the log will show, there were a number of factors in play at the time of the critical failure. Intrepid had inconsistent warp core pressure since the warp drive was initialized and a root cause had not been identified at the time the power failure was experienced.

On top of this, a warp plasma release had been authorized but there had not been a radiation scan done following the confirmation that the plasma dissipation pattern was not abnormal. We saw what we expected, but we didn’t double check this with a more thorough scan.

The Tricobalt devices also caused unexpected subspace distortions. Following a review of the test logs and further simulations I believe that any yield above 18,000 teracochranes will cause detectable and potentially dangerous damage to subspace. I believe that only a maximum yield of 10,000 teracochranes will be necessary for any usage in line with Federation ethical standards.

The class 9 warp drive will need further lab testing before second field tests are conducted to pin down the source of the warp core pressure fluctuations.


INTREPID CLASS DEVELOPMENT